Pooling or purchase: a merger mystery by John R. Walter





n September 14, 1998, WorldCom merged with MCI to form MCI
WorldCom, a global telecommunications giant. On September 30,
NationsBank of Charlotte, North Carolina, and BankAmerica of San
Francisco merged to form BankAmerica, one of the largest banks in the United
States. While each case involved the combination of two ﬁrms, each used a dif-
ferent accounting method. MCI WorldCom’s merger announcement noted that
the combination would be accounted for as a “purchase”; on the other hand,
BankAmerica’s merger used a method called “pooling of interests” accounting.
In May 1991, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) acquired com-
puter manufacturer NCR Corporation (formerly National Cash Register) for
$110 per share, in what was to that date the largest-ever computer industry
merger. Press reports indicated that during negotiations AT&T upped its offer
by $5 per share, an increase of about $325 million, to secure NCR’s cooperation
in accounting for the acquisition as a pooling of interests.1
Here is the mystery. AT&T paid the additional $325 million to use pool-
ing accounting rather than the alternative—purchase accounting—a choice that
affected accounting numbers but neither added assets, reduced liabilities, nor
changed tax treatment. Why then was AT&T willing to expend an additional
$325 million? Both anecdotal and empirical evidence indicate that AT&T’s
preference for pooling is not unusual. Corporate managers frequently go to
some expense to employ pooling, though there are no obvious beneﬁts.
The article beneﬁted greatly from discussions with and comments from J. David Carroll,
Thomas Humphrey, Jeffrey Lacker, Wenli Li, Raymond Owens, Warren Trepeta, and John
Weinberg. The opinions expressed herein are the author’s and do not represent those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 For a detailed discussion of AT&T’s acquisition of NCR, see Lys and Vincent (1995). For
press reports, see Smith (1991) and Cowan (1991).
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These cases raise questions for those not acquainted with the features of
merger and acquisition procedure. What are the differences between purchase
and pooling of interests accounting? Should the choice of accounting method be
of concern to analysts, investors, or others interested in business activity? Why
are two different forms of accounting—purchase and pooling—used for other-
wise similar acquisitions? What drives the choice between the two methods,
and why are acquirers willing to take expensive steps that have only cosmetic
consequences? This article addresses these questions.
Despite ﬁrms’ express preference for pooling, the body responsible for
setting U.S. accounting standards, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB), recently proposed eliminating pooling, even though the accounting
treatment has been used for years. While the change would bring U.S. merger
and acquisition accounting standards more in line with standards used in other
countries, acquisitive corporations are likely to oppose it. The change might
offer some beneﬁts, but the beneﬁts could be offset by efﬁciency losses.
1. POOLING AND PURCHASE: THE NUTS AND BOLTS
Accountants attempt to report in balance sheets an accurate valuation of a ﬁrm’s
assets, liabilities, and equity. But how should accountants value a ﬁrm arising
from the combination of two separate businesses? One approach is to simply
sum the dollar amounts of assets, liabilities, and equity of the two ﬁrms as
they stood before the combination. This is pooling of interests accounting. Or,
since business combinations are typically one ﬁrm’s purchase of another ﬁrm,
another valid method would value the purchased ﬁrm at its purchase price, and
add the purchase price to the assets of the acquiring ﬁrm, as one would if the
acquisition were of a piece of equipment. In broad terms, the latter approach is
purchase accounting. The ﬁnancial statements of a combined ﬁrm will vary with
the choice between pooling or purchase accounting. While accounting methods
for business combinations have changed over time, under today’s accounting
rules both pooling and purchase are acceptable means of valuing combinations
in the United States.
The terms merger, acquisition, consolidation, reorganization, and combina-
tion are often used interchangeably (none is particularly associated with either
pooling or purchase accounting). While no single term predominates, through-
out this article the term business combination will be employed to indicate the
uniting of two ﬁrms, regardless of the features of the uniﬁcation.
Pooling of Interests Accounting
As already implied, pooling of interests accounting is conceptually quite simple.
When a business combination is completed, the balance sheet of the combined
ﬁrm reﬂects assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity at the sum of these accounts   
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as recorded by the separate companies immediately before the combination was
completed. Income statements will show income and expenses for the statement
period in which the combination occurs as if the companies had been combined
from the beginning of the period (FASB 1992, pp. 213–14).
Purchase Accounting
Purchase accounting is somewhat more complicated. Under purchase account-
ing the acquiring and acquired ﬁrms are treated differently, so the ﬁrst step
is to identify which is which. FASB holds that in a typical combination the
acquiring company pays out cash or other assets or issues the stock used in the
acquisition and is the larger of the ﬁrms (FASB 1992, pp. 213–14).
Once acquirer and acquired are identiﬁed, accounting for the acquisition
can proceed. The acquirer is to record on its books the acquisition at the price
paid to the acquired ﬁrm’s owners, using a two-step process. First, assets and
liabilities from the acquired ﬁrm (target) are recorded on the acquirer’s books at
individual market values. Second, any positive difference between acquisition
price and market value of net assets (assets minus liabilities) is recorded as an
asset called goodwill. Once recorded, goodwill is depreciated by equal annual
charges against the combined ﬁrm’s earnings for a period of years over which,
in the accountant’s estimate, the combined ﬁrm beneﬁts from the goodwill built
by the acquired ﬁrm. The amortization period is limited to at most 40 years
(FASB 1992, pp. 227–28). If the market values of the acquired assets and
liabilities are accurately measured, goodwill is the value of the acquired ﬁrm
as a going concern. Alternatively, goodwill can represent promising products
developed by the target, or the price the acquirer is willing to pay for eco-
nomic gains, such as economies of scale, expected from the merger (Brealey
and Myers 1996, p. 930).
The following example may help illustrate purchase accounting. Assume
Honest Auto Maintenance, Inc. (HAM), an auto repair shop management com-
pany, agrees to pay $100 million cash to acquire Wally’s Import Repair, a
regional chain. Following the acquisition, the assets and liabilities purchased
in the acquisition are recorded on HAM’s books at their current market values
as determined by appraisers hired by HAM. The appraisers value the assets
at $160 million and the liabilities at $90 million. So HAM has purchased
net assets with a market value of $70 million ($160M–$90M). To record the
difference between the market value of the net assets and the $100 million
purchase price, $30 million of goodwill is recorded on HAM’s balance sheet.
For the next 40 years (the estimated life of the goodwill according to HAM’s
accountants) HAM will record on its income statement an after-tax expense
of $750,000 ($30M/40 years), decreasing its reported net income each year by
this amount.        
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The Logic Underlying Acquired Goodwill
The same example can be used to illustrate the logic of the purchase accounting
treatment of goodwill. Assuming HAM viewed as accurate its appraisers’ as-
sessment of the market value of Wally’s assets, $70 million of the $100 million
it paid for Wally’s company was for Wally’s tangible assets. The remaining
$30 million was to acquire Wally’s good name in the community, an intangible
asset, but an asset nonetheless. The asset will yield a future return. Following
the acquisition, the value of Wally’s good name must be recorded as an asset
(called goodwill) on HAM’s books; if it is not, HAM’s worth is understated.
The $30 million expense borne to purchase the good name is not realized
(charged against earnings) when the purchase is made but over time as the
asset produces matching revenues. If the ﬁrm does not match expenses with
the revenues these expenses produce, outsiders viewing HAM ﬁnancial state-
ments could be misled. For example, if instead all of the expense were recorded
on the date the asset was purchased, proﬁts would appear inappropriately low
during the year of the purchase and too high in later years when the revenues
generated by Wally’s good name are received. So the annual $750,000 charges
against earnings must be recorded on HAM’s income statements throughout
the estimated life of the asset.
The value of the asset must also be depreciated (lowered) over time. The
logic here is that like most assets, Wally’s good name has a limited life. Over
time Wally’s customers will move away or die off or, alternatively, learn that
Wally is no longer running the operation and shift their business to competi-
tors. Therefore the value of the good name declines over time, and goodwill is
depreciated by $750,000 each year.2
When to Purchase and When to Pool
How do accountants determine whether to pool or purchase? A set of rules
speciﬁes the characteristics of combinations that can receive pooling or, al-
ternatively, purchase treatment. The rules are intended to distinguish between
two types of combinations: one represents ﬁrms joining forces, and the other
represents one ﬁrm buying the assets and liabilities of another. Theoretically, in
the ﬁrst instance, the combined ﬁrm receives pooling treatment, and in the sec-
ond, it receives purchase. Regardless of the intent of the rules, in reality ﬁrms
can often choose their accounting treatment by structuring the combination
carefully, though at possible extra cost.
2 This example assumes straight-line depreciation whereby the asset is depreciated by equal
yearly amounts. Other depreciation schedules are allowed under acquisition accounting rules.    
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The Rules
The rules are part of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Com-
bined ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial statements, like those of all ﬁrms, must adhere to GAAP,
and therefore be in accord with the rules, to be deemed transparent, or not
misleading, by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and for inde-
pendent auditors to grant an unqualiﬁed audit report (Woelfel 1994, pp. 518,
1037).
Today GAAP is established by FASB, a private sector organization funded
by contributions from professional accounting associations. The ultimate au-
thority for determining GAAP rests with the SEC, however. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 gave the SEC authority for establishing accounting and
reporting standards for publicly held companies. The SEC delegates the setting
of accounting standards to FASB, subject to SEC review.
The rules (called conditions by accountants), of which there are 12, were
established in 1970 by the Accounting Principles Board (predecessor to FASB).
If one or more of the conditions is violated, the combination must be accounted
for as a purchase. If all conditions are met, pooling treatment is obligatory. (See
the Box on page 44 for a list of the conditions.)
In general terms, the 12 pooling conditions prohibit certain ﬁnancial trans-
actions for speciﬁed periods before and after the acquisition and place restric-
tions on the terms of the acquisition. For example, one condition requires that
the owners of the target be compensated predominantly with acquirer stock
(speciﬁcally, 90 percent of consideration must be in stock—see condition 4
in the Box). Fundamentally, this condition and several others are intended to
prohibit from pooling those combinations in which most target owners do not
remain combined ﬁrm owners. This intention is based on the idea that to receive
pooling treatment the combination must simply be the joining of two ﬁrms,
with the former owners of the two ﬁrms continuing as owners of the combined
ﬁrm. Other conditions prohibit acquirer and target repurchases of stock for a
period before and after the acquisition. In a stock repurchase owners are bought
out for cash and therefore relinquish their ownership interest in the combined
ﬁrm.
Motivation for the Rules
By long-standing accounting convention, assets are recorded in ﬁnancial state-
ments at their original purchase price and liabilities at the amount of the original
debt. The convention is known as historical cost accounting. But when does
the original purchase of assets occur, and when are the liabilities assumed?
Normally the answer is simple, but not necessarily when ﬁrms combine.
If the combination is simply the purchase of all of the assets and liabilities
of the target ﬁrm, then historical cost accounting implies that the combined
ﬁrm originally purchased the assets and originally assumed the liabilities on    
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the date the combination occurred. Accordingly, purchase accounting offers
the appropriate treatment for such combinations. Operating under the notion
that acquirers pay market value for assets and liabilities of targets, purchase
accounting demands that each individual acquired asset be recorded at its mar-
ket value at the time of the combination. As previously noted, the difference
between the purchase price and the market value of net assets is recorded in
a new asset account, goodwill, to account for the going concern value of the
target at the time of the combination.
If, instead, two ﬁrms have combined with neither of them buying the other,
no assets or liabilities change hands at the time of the combination. In this case,
historical cost accounting demands that assets and liabilities be valued at the
prices the target ﬁrm paid for them when it originally purchased or assumed
them, perhaps years before the date of the combination. In other words, here
historical cost accounting demands pooling treatment, in which the values as
reported on the target’s ﬁnancial statements are carried over to the combined
ﬁrm’s statements.
There is no economic content to the distinction between combinations char-
acterized by a joining of forces and those characterized by one ﬁrm buying the
assets and liabilities of another. The bottom line is that the assets and liabilities
of the two ﬁrms are merged together; therefore, the resulting ﬁrm is equivalent
in either case. Furthermore, in a dynamic stock market, ownership changes
hands constantly anyway as shares of stock are traded, so it makes no differ-
ence whether the same set of owners remains immediately before and after the
combination.
Even if Pooling Rules are Violated, Firms May Still Manage to Pool
A ﬁrm that has violated one of the 12 conditions may still be able to pursue
remedial steps that would allow it to pool. For example, prior to AT&T’s
purchase of NCR in 1991, NCR had repurchased several million shares of its
own stock, thus violating a condition that seemed to make pooling impossible.
So that AT&T could continue to employ the pooling accounting method, NCR
agreed to reverse the stock repurchase by placing an equivalent amount of
Treasury stock before the acquisition was completed (Gilson and Black 1995,
p. 537; Lys and Vincent 1995, p. 367). Afterwards, the private placement was
deemed sufﬁcient to mend the violation of the condition.
2. THE MYSTERY: WHY DO ACQUIRERS
PREFER POOLING?
The ﬁnancial press and specialists in mergers and acquisitions maintain that
acquirers prefer pooling to purchase accounting. Empirical analysis supports
this view as well. It provides evidence that acquirers are willing to pay higher       
J. R. Walter: Pooling or Purchase 33
bid prices in acquisitions that are pooled than in those that use purchase ac-
counting. Likewise, even though there can be additional costs of qualifying for
pooling, discussed below, the current signiﬁcant use of pooling argues for the
presence of a fairly strong preference. So what beneﬁt underlies this strong
preference?
At ﬁrst blush one might imagine that pooling has some tax advantage. But,
as shown later, advantageous tax treatment plays only a peripheral role, so taxes
alone cannot explain the preference for pooling. Instead, both observers and
acquirers themselves often argue that pooling is advantageous because reported
earnings will generally be larger with pooling than with purchase.
For those who believe that markets are efﬁcient whereby stocks are priced
accurately based on all available information, the reported earnings explanation
is puzzling, however. While accounting numbers are enhanced using the pooling
method, ﬁrm performance is unaffected by the accounting choice. Moreover,
information is available that allows investors to eliminate the effect on reported
earnings. What follows will examine the puzzle but can offer no solution.
Acquirers Prefer Pooling
Attorneys and accountants specializing in mergers and acquisitions, as well
as the ﬁnancial press, report a strong preference among acquirers for pooling
treatment.3 To use pooling, all 12 conditions must be met (or violations must be
mended). Some conditions severely restrict the structure of combinations and
restrain the future actions of acquirers. Under the circumstances, the fact that
pooling is chosen at all, much less that it predominates for large combinations,
seems strong evidence that the reports are accurate.
AT&T’s acquisition of NCR illustrates some of the costs of meeting pooling
conditions. AT&T bore the expense of reversing NCR’s earlier stock repur-
chases, an expense estimated to be $50 million (Lys and Vincent 1995, p. 367).
Additionally, during negotiations with NCR, AT&T offered to increase its bid
by $5 a share to $110 a share, or by $325 million, if NCR would make it
possible to use pooling of interests accounting (Lys and Vincent 1995, p. 368).
Similarly, acquisitive ﬁrms often give up or at least put off stock repurchases
to avoid running afoul of pooling conditions.
As noted in a 1997 Wall Street Journal article, “[c]learly, companies prefer
pooling over...purchase accounting....Since 1992, there have been 357
poolings vs. 36 purchase acquisitions in deals valued at over $100 million.
...S of a rthis year, there have been 41 poolings vs. four purchase acqui-
sitions” (MacDonald 1997).
3 Attorney and accountant reports of a preference come from the author’s interviews of
merger and acquisition specialists.     
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Tax Avoidance Offers Only a Partial Explanation of the
Pooling Preference
Does pooling offer a tax advantage not available under purchase accounting?
The answer is that while no tax advantage results directly from pooling, one
of the conditions that must be met to qualify a combination for certain tax
advantages is also a key condition for pooling treatment. Consequently, the
desire to attain tax advantages might account for some of the apparent pref-
erence for pooling treatment. Still, factors beyond taxes must explain most of
the preference.
To What Extent Do Taxes Explain Pooling’s Predominance?
In broad terms, under the Internal Revenue Code a combination is treated either
as a tax-free reorganization, in which no taxes are assessed in response to the
combination, or as taxable, in which case certain taxes are typically imposed.
In a tax-free reorganization, the target’s shareholders face no capital gains taxes
on their stock as a result of the combination; instead, these taxes are deferred.
While target shareholders receive the direct beneﬁt, acquirers can expect to
beneﬁt as well, since target shareholders are likely to agree to a lower bid price
if they are assured the acquisition will be deemed tax free. Alternatively, if a
combination is deemed taxable, the target’s shareholders must pay capital gains
taxes on the exchange or sale of their stock.
One of the major conditions for a combination to be deemed tax free is
that a majority of the consideration paid the target’s shareholders be stock of
the acquiring ﬁrm. In certain types of combinations, all consideration must be
stock for the combination to be tax free. The upshot is that a ﬁrm wishing
its combination to receive tax-free status automatically meets one of the fun-
damental conditions for pooling treatment—that the consideration be largely
in stock. One might imagine, therefore, that the numerical predominance of
ﬁrms choosing pooling treatment to some degree results from a preference for
tax-free status.
The Pooling Preference Goes Beyond Taxes
If the conditions for tax-free treatment equaled those for pooling treatment, then
the desire to avoid taxes might completely account for ﬁrms predominantly
choosing pooling treatment. But the two sets of conditions are not equivalent.
Instead, acquirers often choose to structure a combination to meet conditions
for tax-free reorganization while stopping short of encumbering themselves
with the conditions for pooling, some of which restrict valuable future actions.
A prominent example of a tax-free combination that used purchase rather
than pooling accounting was when NationsBank Corporation, a large U.S.
banking organization based in Charlotte, North Carolina, acquired Boatmen’s   
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Bancshares of St. Louis in 1997. In this case the acquirer did not wish to
pool because it intended to undertake stock repurchases in conjunction with
the acquisition (NationsBank 1996, 1997).
Yet other ﬁrms are willing to take the extra step of meeting all of the
pooling conditions, apparently for some beneﬁt they perceive beyond tax-free
status. For example, to qualify for pooling, acquisitive ﬁrms often willingly
forgo planned stock repurchases, a step necessary for pooling treatment but not
required for tax-free status.
Beyond the logical argument, there is empirical evidence that supports the
theory that a pooling preference exists apart from any tax incentive. Robinson
and Shane (1990) test for an association between accounting treatment and the
premium paid for an acquisition, holding tax status constant. A premium is
the difference between the bid price paid by the acquirer and the stock market
value of a ﬁrm before its acquisition. Their hypothesis is that if acquirers pre-
fer pooling to purchase accounting, one would expect acquirers to pay higher
premia for such acquisitions. Using a sample of 95 tax-free acquisitions made
between 1972 and 1982, including 59 accounted for by pooling of interests and
36 by purchase, Robinson and Shane ﬁnd that, other things equal, acquirers
pay more for pooling acquisitions than for purchase acquisitions. They pro-
vide estimates of the premia difference using various procedures. The average
premia in pooled acquisitions exceeded the average in purchase acquisitions
by between 29 and 66 percent. All the estimated differences were statistically
signiﬁcant. Consequently, the study suggests two conclusions, (1) that there
is a measurable preference for pooling, borne out in the higher price paid for
pooled acquisitions, and (2) since the study includes only tax-free acquisitions,
acquirers prefer pooling for reasons beyond tax considerations.
Improved Reported Earnings as an Explanation for the
Pooling Preference
If taxes cannot explain the pooling preference, what other motives remain?
One frequently discussed explanation is that pooling allows acquirers to avoid
purchase’s negative effects on accounting earnings reported in ﬁnancial state-
ments in the years after the acquisition is completed. When purchase price
exceeds book value of the target’s equity, pooling accounting will produce
higher reported earnings than purchase accounting for two reasons. First, good-
will depreciation lowers earnings but is not present in a pooled combination.
Second, future reported earnings are reduced as higher depreciation expenses
are recorded for the marked-up (to market value) assets in a purchase, but
not pooled, combination. The view is that acquisitive ﬁrms are concerned that
lower future reported earnings depress post-transaction stock prices.
The ﬁnancial press often promotes this view (though articles typically focus
only on the effect of negative earnings from goodwill depreciation and ignore    
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higher depreciation from marked-up assets). For example, a March 1997 Insti-
tutional Investor article points to an instance in which a deal failed, in part, over
the effect on reported earnings of purchase accounting’s goodwill amortization.
One reason for the failure of Paramount Communication’s 1989 bid for Time,
Inc. was the “staggering load [of goodwill amortization that] was expected to
depress the earnings of the acquiring company—and its stock price—for years
to come” (McGoldrick 1997, p. 145). Likewise, a 1998 Wall Street Journal arti-
cle on SEC efforts to reduce the use of pooling notes that the “drawback to pur-
chase accounting is that it [imposes] an earnings penalty” (MacDonald 1998b).
Concern for reported earnings was apparently a major factor underlying
AT&T’s willingness to go to considerable additional expense to pool. In their
review of AT&T’s acquisition of NCR, Lys and Vincent (1995) conclude that
a concern for a negative effect of goodwill amortization on future AT&T stock
price was responsible for AT&T’s willingness to expend at least an additional
$375 million (i.e., 5 percent of the total acquisition price) to pool. Speciﬁcally,
Lys and Vincent report that when they interviewed AT&T spokesmen, the
spokesmen indicated that AT&T management believed that “ﬁnancial analysts
would...penalize AT&T’s stock price for lower earnings [resulting from
purchase’s goodwill amortization]” (Lys and Vincent 1995, p. 370).
Outside of these reports, a number of empirical studies have investigated
earnings maximization as a possible motive in acquirers’ accounting choices.
The studies ﬁnd that acquirers act predictably if accounting choice (i.e., the
choice between pooling and purchase) was motivated to maximize reported
earnings.
When purchase price is higher than the target’s book value, acquired asset
depreciation and goodwill amortization charges will result. If managers are
interested in maximizing reported earnings, they will prefer pooling to pur-
chase when purchase price is higher than book value. Moreover, the larger the
amount by which purchase price exceeds target book value, the more likely the
manager should choose pooling. In research reviewed in Robinson and Shane
(1990), a number of analysts found statistical evidence that managers choose
to pool when the purchase/book value differential is positive; furthermore, the
more positive the differential, the more likely pooling is chosen.
By All Logic, Acquirers Should Not Prefer Pooling to Purchase
The choice between pooling and purchase has no apparent economic conse-
quences. Goodwill amortization charges are not cash ﬂows and only serve to
lower reported earnings. These charges have no effect on the current or future
income produced by the activities of the ﬁrm. As a result, one would expect in-
vestors to ignore such changes to reported income and instead focus on changes
in ﬁnancial reports that signal changes in future income or in the health of the
ﬁrm. While there appears to be abundant evidence of managers’ preference     
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for pooling, as previous sections have described, acquisitive managers should
be indifferent between pooling and purchase if investors look beyond reported
earnings.
Nevertheless, the question arises: Do investors have sufﬁcient information
with which to remove the distortion produced by the pooling-purchase choice?
The answer is yes. Such information is typically available in proxy statements
associated with an acquisition so that interested investors should be able to
remove the effects of goodwill on future earnings.
Empirical investigation supports the argument that the differences in re-
ported earnings under pooling and purchase do not sway investors. Hong,
Kaplan, and Mandelker (1978) examined empirically the stock price reaction to
acquirers’ pooling-purchase choice. They did so by using a statistical technique
known as event study, which isolates the stock market’s reaction to the event
in question. In this case the event was business combinations accounted for
either by pooling or by purchase methods.
Hong, et al. investigated acquisitions made in the period 1954 through
1964, when rules that limited the choice between the two accounting methods
were more lax than those adopted in 1970. All acquisitions in the authors’
sample were tax free.4 They found no evidence that stock prices of acquirers
using purchase accounting suffered relative to that of acquirers using pooling
accounting. In fact, just the opposite was true—the stock price of acquirers
using purchase accounting rose around the time of the acquisition while the
stock price of poolers demonstrated no signiﬁcant change.
Davis (1990) repeated the Hong, et al. study using a somewhat more ad-
vanced methodology and sampling business combinations that occurred after
rules were tightened in 1970. Davis’s sample covered the period between 1971
and 1982, and as with Hong, et al., it included only tax-free combinations. His
results were equivalent to those in the earlier study. In other words, there was
little evidence of a stock price reaction to pooled mergers but a signiﬁcantly
positive stock price reaction to mergers accounted for as purchases. Nonethe-
less, the positive reaction for purchases occurred largely in the six months
prior to the mergers’ announcements, presumably before the market knew the
accounting method to be used. In the period after the merger announcements,
the stock price reaction was positive for purchase and negative for pooling, but
neither reaction was statistically signiﬁcant. In sum, Davis’s results show no
stock price beneﬁt from pooling. Therefore, Hong, et al.’s results seem to hold
up well across time and across accounting rule regimes.
4 Typically, combinations in which the acquired ﬁrm’s shareholders sell their shares for cash
are taxable to the acquired ﬁrm’s shareholders, while those in which the acquired ﬁrm’s share-
holders are paid in stock are not taxable. Hong, et al. include in their sample only combinations
in which the compensation was stock.         
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The Hong, et al. and Davis ﬁndings are in line with those of other event
studies examining various types of ﬁrm choices that alter accounting numbers
but have no economic effect (Brealey and Myers 1996, pp. 342–44; Copeland
and Weston 1983, pp. 319–27). Such ﬁndings indicate that investors make use
of information beyond reported earnings to make their stock investment deci-
sions, ignoring accounting numbers that have no real economic signiﬁcance.
3. FASB MAY ELIMINATE POOLING
Ever since pooling was ﬁrst ofﬁcially recognized almost 50 years ago, ﬁrms
wishing to qualify have had to meet certain conditions. Yet over the years, busi-
nesses have attempted to test and expand the limits set on pooling treatment.
Accounting rulemakers have consistently viewed this expansion as an abuse
of the proper use of pooling and have responded by tightening the conditions.
Nevertheless, inventive acquirers have successfully circumvented the stricter
conditions. The opportunity for such expansion could end shortly, however. On
April 21, 1999, FASB announced a proposal to eliminate pooling before 2001
(FASB 1999). FASB has noted several reasons, but two other factors discussed
below seem worthy of consideration.
History of the Two Methods
While there were no ofﬁcial pronouncements before World War II, purchase
accounting was apparently the more uniformly accepted method among ac-
countants. For example, according to a 1943 version of the Accountants’ Hand-
book, pooling treatment was “questionable,” and purchase accounting was the
“proper” means.5 Pooling treatment began to gain favor among accountants in
the late 1940s as more acquirers paid target ﬁrm owners with shares of stock
in the combined company rather than with cash (Wyatt 1963, p. 24). As the
means of payment shifted to stock, the outcome in these combinations was that
owners from both the target and acquirer remained owners of the combined
ﬁrm. As such, no sale of the assets had occurred, and there was no reason to
revalue assets of the acquired ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst authoritative pronouncement on accounting for business combi-
nations embraced this interpretation. The Committee on Accounting Procedure,
a predecessor of FASB and the body responsible for establishing GAAP at the
time, issued Accounting Research Bulletin No. 40 in September 1950, which
stated that pooling treatment was allowed if several broadly speciﬁed conditions
could be met; otherwise, purchase accounting was to be used. The ﬁrst and pri-
5 W. A. Paton, editor, Accountants’ Handbook, third edition, 1943, as cited in Wyatt (1963),
p. 21.       
J. R. Walter: Pooling or Purchase 39
mary condition required that “substantially all” of the owners of predecessor
corporations be paid with shares of the combined company rather than with
cash or other assets. The other conditions were that neither of the combining
ﬁrms be “minor” in size relative to the other, managers from both ﬁrms be
retained in the combined ﬁrm (“management continuity”), and the activities of
the combining ﬁrms be “either similar or complementary.”6 (Wyatt 1963, pp.
24–25, 123–26.)
Still, businesses had no strong preference for pooling at ﬁrst because until
1953 purchase accounting did not necessarily result in charges against future
reported earnings. Firms were allowed to charge the excess of purchase price
over the acquired ﬁrm’s book value to a capital account (called surplus). As a
result, acquirers avoided the depreciation and amortization charges that lowered
reported earnings. This capital account option was an alternative to establish-
ing a goodwill account and recording future charges against earnings as under
today’s purchase accounting (Wyatt 1963, pp. 34, 38–39, 59). But in 1953,
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 eliminated the option of deducting the
excess from surplus. With this change, a strong preference for pooling over
purchase accounting began to surface apparently because of acquirers’ aversion
to charges against reported earnings (Wyatt 1963, pp. 38–39, 59–60).
By the late 1950s, accountants were expanding the vaguely speciﬁed pool-
ing conditions to include more and more combinations (Wyatt 1963, pp. 61–
62). For example, the condition requiring that the target’s owners be com-
pensated in stock was effectively relaxed as deals that involved substantial
amounts of cash were soon treated as poolings. Likewise, the condition that
neither combining ﬁrm be minor in size was continually tested so that by the
1960s, deals were handled as poolings even when the seller made up only 1
percent of the combined ﬁrm (Scharf, Shea, and Beck 1991, pp. 177–78). As
a result, by the second half of the 1960s, pooling became predominant (Hong,
Kaplan, and Mandelker 1978, p. 34). Clearly, businesses could and did choose
pooling regardless of the features of the transaction.
In 1970 the Accounting Principles Board (APB; descendent of the Com-
mittee on Accounting Procedure and predecessor of FASB) issued new rules
for business combinations intended to limit the use of pooling (FASB 1997, p.
2). Before the passage of these stricter rules, which are still in effect today, the
SEC had itself threatened action to limit poolings. Initially the APB proposal
completely prohibited pooling, but because the business community reacted
6 The wording of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 40 indicates a willingness to allow some
violations of the size, management continuity, and activity similarity conditions without necessar-
ily requiring purchase treatment. In reference to these three conditions, it says: “No one of these
factors would necessarily be determinative, but their presence or absence would be cumulative
in effect.” The Bulletin offers no signs of ﬂexibility in the requirement that payment to acquired
ﬁrm shareholders be in the form of stock of the surviving ﬁrm. (Bulletin No. 40 is reproduced in
Wyatt [1963], pp. 123–26.)       
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negatively, it settled on new rules restricting pooling somewhat (Gilson and
Black 1995, p. 517).
Today the tighter conditions make qualiﬁcation more difﬁcult. Neverthe-
less, as demonstrated by AT&T in 1991, combinations that might at ﬁrst appear
to be in violation can meet the pooling conditions if they follow some creative
and at times costly procedures. The recent predominance of pooling for large
combinations attests to the ability of ﬁrms to arrange their transactions to meet
pooling conditions.
FASB’s Proposed Change and Its Motivations
In August 1996 FASB once again began to consider changing the rules gov-
erning U.S. accounting treatment of business combinations. After reviewing a
number of options, on April 21, 1999, FASB announced a proposal to eliminate
pooling of interests accounting. FASB plans to release for comment its formal
proposal early in the third quarter 1999 (FASB 1999). According to press re-
ports, the international accounting community had encouraged FASB to adopt
standards closer to international standards. The SEC likewise had urged FASB
changes, and FASB itself had shown interest in aligning its standards more
closely with international standards prior to the recent announcement (FASB
1997, p. 3; McGoldrick 1997, p. 147; MacDonald 1998a, pp. A2, A7; FASB
1999). FASB’s proposed elimination of pooling would align the standards since
most other nations allow pooling only infrequently or not at all.7 However, U.S.
companies are likely to oppose the proposed elimination.
FASB expressed several motives for eliminating pooling both prior to and
as part of its April 21 announcement. Given that pooling is infrequently used
in other countries, one reason FASB is planning to eliminate it is to sim-
plify international accounting comparisons (FASB 1997, p. 21). FASB also
wishes to prevent “abuses” of pooling; presumably, by “abuse” FASB means
that ﬁrms are constantly stretching the deﬁnition of pooling to ﬁt more and more
combinations (FASB 1997, p. 2). Recently the SEC penalized just such stretch-
ing in some highly publicized cases. Several acquirers were required to revise
ﬁnancial statements to record as purchases combinations that had previously
been shown as poolings (McCafferty 1998, p. 23; MacDonald 1998b, pp. C1,
C2). Last, FASB wants to make comparison across U.S. ﬁrms simpler. Compar-
ison is costly now, involving as it does two very different accounting treatments
for business combinations (FASB 1999).
7 See McGoldrick (1997) and FASB (1997) for a listing of business combination accounting
standards in other major countries. For example, Australia allows no poolings at all, while Canada
allows them only when an acquirer cannot be identiﬁed. In the case of Canada, the merger partner
with more than 50 percent of the combined ﬁrm is assumed to be the acquirer.   
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An Additional Rationale for Eliminating Pooling
One can imagine an additional reason for preferring purchase to pooling. Pur-
chase accounting requires acquiring ﬁrms to reveal more up-to-date information
about the value of the target ﬁrm’s assets and liabilities than that revealed by
pooling, thereby potentially lowering information costs to investors. Speciﬁ-
cally, target ﬁrm assets and liabilities must be recorded on the combined ﬁrm’s
books at their market values as of the time of the combination. Alternatively,
under pooling treatment the target’s assets and liabilities are recorded at histor-
ical cost, or value at the time they were originally obtained by the target, with
no adjustment for price changes occurring since.
The current market values can be useful in the following manner. Imag-
ine ﬁrst Conceal, Incorporated, a ﬁrm arising out of a pooled combination of
Conceal, Inc. (the surviving ﬁrm) and Target, Inc. An investor considering a
purchase of stock in Conceal will wish to determine whether Conceal received
a good price on its purchase of Target in order to judge the quality of Conceal’s
management. Because the Conceal-Target combination was pooled, Conceal’s
ﬁnancial statements reveal only the historical asset and liability values (the
prices originally paid for the assets and the debts originally contracted for) of
Target. Yet the investor is concerned that the true market values may be quite
different due to inﬂuences or disturbances (shocks) that may have affected
prices of some of Target’s assets.
The investor believes that analysts who have studied Target’s stock make
recommendations inﬂuencing its price that fail to account for the effect of
the shocks on Target’s asset values. So the investor is left to make his stock
purchase decision based on historical asset values for Target and on his own
admittedly rough estimate of how the shock might have affected Target’s true
asset values.
On the other hand, imagine Divulge, Inc., a new ﬁrm resulting from a
combination of Divulge, Inc. (the surviving ﬁrm) and S. Target and Sons.
Suppose this combination received purchase accounting treatment. Here the
situation is exactly the same as the Conceal case except the investor has
access, from Divulge’s ﬁnancial statements, to the current market values of
S. Target’s assets and liabilities. In this case, the investor need not estimate the
effect of the shocks on various S. Target assets because the ﬁgures are provided
on Divulge’s ﬁnancial statements.
Are the market values of S. Target’s assets and liabilities, as reported on
Divulge’s ﬁnancial statement, likely to be accurate, or will Divulge be able to
manipulate their values to paint a more positive picture? For assets and liabili-
ties with no secondary market, the estimates of market values will necessarily
involve some subjective judgments. Still, there is a fairly well-established body
of rules and procedures used to guide the pricing of such assets. These rules,
developed by the appraisal industry, have been tested in court cases over the   
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years. If the appraiser hired by Divulge to evaluate S. Target does not abide by
the rules, he could be sued. Therefore, while manipulation is certainly possible,
the threat of lawsuits brought by disgruntled stockholders tends to encourage
reasonable valuations.
Consequently, purchase accounting may provide investors with superior
information compared to pooling of interests accounting. At the very least,
purchase provides all the information pooling does along with an appraiser’s
estimate of market values of the target’s assets and liabilities.
A Move to Eliminate Pooling Should be Undertaken Cautiously
As shown previously, not only has FASB identiﬁed several reasons to eliminate
pooling, but also this article has noted that purchase accounting may provide
superior information as compared to pooling. Nevertheless, FASB might wish
to consider one factor before proceeding with its proposal to eliminate pooling.
Pooling may produce some real cost savings that are not immediately ev-
ident, for managers prefer pooling in spite of no apparent stock price beneﬁt
and therefore no beneﬁt to owners. Are managers simply acting foolishly?
This seems unlikely, since one expects foolish behavior to be punished and
eventually extinguished by a reasonably efﬁcient stock market. Yet poolers are
not penalized by the stock market, and the pooling preference has continued
for years, perhaps because pooling allows some ﬁrms cost savings, offsetting
the additional costs of meeting conditions to pool.
It is not difﬁcult to imagine, at least in broad terms, how beneﬁts from
pooling might arise. For example, perhaps pooling may give the combined ﬁrm
greater ﬂexibility in its future accounting. Managers may use that ﬂexibility to
increase their salaries and bonuses. While such managerial actions may appear
to enrich managers at stockholders’ expense, they may be necessary to achieve
a preferred compensation and incentive arrangement between management and
ownership. The beneﬁts of achieving the preferred arrangement might exceed
the costs of achieving pooling.
However, if beneﬁts exceed the costs of achieving pooling, would we not
then expect empirical tests (e.g., Hong et al.) of stock price reactions to have
shown pooling to be rewarded more highly than purchase? Not necessarily.
Some ﬁrms may not need to allow managers the added ﬂexibility to extract
higher compensation. Since these ﬁrms may prefer other management compen-
sation arrangements, they are free to use purchase accounting, thereby avoiding
the additional costs of meeting the conditions to pool. Any ﬁrm, whether it is
one that chooses pooling or one that chooses purchase, will be rewarded for
choosing its optimal accounting strategy.
The important point here is that unless managers are irrational, and as long
as the market is fairly efﬁcient, there is reason to believe that ﬁrms’ preference
for pooling is driven by some real cost savings. Attempting to identify that
beneﬁt perhaps should be a prerequisite to eliminating pooling.   
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4. CONCLUSION
In the post–World War II period, business combinations have received one of
two accounting treatments, pooling of interests or purchase accounting. From
the start, businesses preferred pooling and are apparently willing to pay for it,
by most accounts because it allows them to report higher earnings. Yet that
accounting choice neither increases assets, reduces liabilities, nor modiﬁes tax
treatment, so in theory it ought to be ignored by investors. The preference for
pooling is especially puzzling since empirical research implies that investors are
not swayed by whether merged ﬁrms employ pooling or purchase accounting.
While the puzzle has yet to be solved analytically, there is a good chance
that it will diminish in importance for business decisions. The Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board has indicated that it may well eliminate pooling,
bringing U.S. business combination accounting standards in line with those in
other industrialized nations. This article suggests that while the elimination of
pooling in favor of purchase accounting could produce beneﬁts by requiring
more complete disclosures in ﬁnancial statements, it also might eliminate ar-
rangements that owners and managers ﬁnd to be cost-saving. Evidence that
acquirers are willing to bear additional costs to pool, combined with the lack
of a stock price penalty for poolers, at least hints at the presence of some
as-yet-undetermined cost savings.    
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The Twelve Conditions For Pooling
1. Each of the combining companies is autonomous and has not been a
subsidiary or division of another corporation within two years before the plan
of combination is initiated.
2. Each of the combining companies is independent of the other combin-
ing companies, meaning that none of the combining companies have signiﬁ-
cant equity investments (greater than 10 percent of outstanding voting common
stock) in one another.
3. The combination is effected in a single transaction or is completed in
accordance with a speciﬁc plan within one year after the plan is initiated.
4. Payment is effected by one corporation offering and issuing only com-
mon stock in exchange for substantially all (meaning 90 percent or more) of
the voting common stock interest of another company. The common stock is-
sued must have rights that are identical to those of the majority of the issuing
company’s outstanding voting common stock.
5. None of the combining companies changes the equity interest of its
voting common stock for two years before the plan to combine is initiated
or between the dates the combination is initiated and consummated. Changes
to equity interests may include distributions to stockholders and additional
issuances, exchanges, and retirements of securities.
6. None of the combining companies reacquires shares of its voting stock
except for purposes other than business combinations. Examples of allowable
share repurchases might include shares for stock option and compensation
plans and other recurring distributions provided a systematic pattern is estab-
lished at least two years before the plan of combination is initiated.
7. The ratio of the interest of an individual common stockholder to those
of other common stockholders in the combination is unchanged before and
after the combination. In other words, each individual common stockholder
who exchanges his stock receives a voting common stock interest exactly in
proportion to his relative voting common stock interest before the combination
is effected.
8. Voting rights in the combined company are exercisable by the stock-
holders. This condition is not met, however, if shares of common stock issued
to effect the combination are transferred to a voting trust, in which case the
individual stockholders would lose the ability to vote.
9. The combination is resolved at the date the plan is consummated.
In other words, the combined corporation does not agree to issue additional
shares of stock or other consideration on any contingency at a later date to
former stockholders of the combining companies.
10. The combined corporation does not agree to retire or reacquire any
of the common stock issued to effect the combination.
11. The combined corporation does not enter into other ﬁnancial arrange-
ments—such as a guaranty of loans secured by stock issued in the combination,
which in effect negates the exchange of equity securities—for the beneﬁt of
former stockholders of a combining company.
12. The combined corporation does not intend to dispose of a signiﬁ-
cant part of the assets of the combining companies—other than disposals in
the normal course of business or to eliminate duplicate facilities or excess
capacity—within two years after the combination.
Source: Financial Accounting Standards Board (1992), pp. 209–12.    
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